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Abstract
We investigate how reinforcement learning agents
can learn to cooperate. Drawing inspiration from
human societies, in which successful coordination
of many individuals is often facilitated by hierar-
chical organisation, we introduce Feudal Multi-
agent Hierarchies (FMH). In this framework, a
‘manager’ agent, which is tasked with maximis-
ing the environmentally-determined reward func-
tion, learns to communicate subgoals to multiple,
simultaneously-operating, ‘worker’ agents. Work-
ers, which are rewarded for achieving managerial
subgoals, take concurrent actions in the world.
We outline the structure of FMH and demonstrate
its potential for decentralised learning and control.
We find that, given an adequate set of subgoals
from which to choose, FMH performs, and partic-
ularly scales, substantially better than cooperative
approaches that use a shared reward function.
1. Introduction
In cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning,
simultaneously-acting agents must learn to work together to
achieve a shared set of goals. A straightforward approach
is for each agent to optimise a global objective using
single-agent reinforcement learning (RL) methods such as
Q-Learning (Watkins & Dayan, 1992) or policy gradients
(Williams, 1992; Sutton et al., 2000). Unfortunately this
suffers various problems in general.
First, from the perspective of any one agent, the environ-
ment is non-stationary. This is because as other agents learn,
their policies change, creating a partially unobservable influ-
ence on the effect of the first agent’s actions. This issue has
recently been addressed by a variety of deep RL methods,
for instance with centralised training of ultimately decen-
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tralised policies (Lowe et al., 2017; Foerster et al., 2018).
However, this requires that the centralised critic or critics
have access to the actions and observations of all agents
during training, which may not always be possible.
A second problem is coordination; agents must learn how
to choose actions coherently, even in environments in
which many optimal equilibria exist (Matignon et al., 2012).
Whilst particularly challenging when agents are completely
independent, such problems can be made more feasible if
a form of communication is allowed (Vlassis, 2007). Nev-
ertheless, it is difficult for agents to learn how to communi-
cate relevant information effectively to solve coordination
problems, with most approaches relying on further helpful
properties such as a differentiable communication channel
(Sukhbaatar et al., 2016; Foerster et al., 2016) and/or a
model of the world’s dynamics (Mordatch & Abbeel, 2018).
Third, multi-agent methods scale poorly – the effective state
space grows exponentially with the number of agents. Learn-
ing a centralised value function therefore suffers the curse of
dimensionality, whilst the alternative of decentralised learn-
ing often appears inadequate for addressing non-stationarity.
Optimising a global objective also becomes challenging at
scale, as it becomes difficult to assign credit to each agent
(Wolpert & Tumer, 2002; Chang et al., 2004).
A clue for meeting this myriad of challenges may lie in the
way in which human and animal societies are hierarchically
structured. In particular, even in broadly cooperative groups,
it is frequently the case that different individuals agree to
be assigned different objectives which they work towards
for the benefit of the collective. For example, members of
a company typically have different roles and responsibili-
ties. They will likely report to managers who define their
objectives, and they may in turn be able to set objectives
to more junior members. At the highest level, the CEO is
responsible for the company’s overall performance.
Inspired by this idea, we propose an approach for the multi-
agent domain, which organises many, simultaneously acting
agents into a managerial hierarchy. Whilst typically all
agents in a cooperative task seek to optimise a shared re-
ward, in Feudal Multi-agent Hierarchies (FMH) we instead
only expose the highest-level manager to this ‘task’ reward.
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The manager must therefore learn to solve the principal-
agent problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) of communicat-
ing subgoals, which define a reward function, to the worker
agents under its control. Workers learn to satisfy these sub-
goals by taking actions in the world and/or by setting their
own subgoals for workers immediately below them in the
hierarchy.
FMH allows for a diversity of rewards. This can provide
individual agents with a rich learning signal, but necessarily
implies that interactions between agents will not in general
be fully cooperative. However, the intent of our design
is to achieve collective behaviours which are apparently
cooperative, from the perspective of an outside observer
viewing performance on the task objective.
Our idea is a development of a single-agent method for hier-
archical RL known as feudal RL (Dayan & Hinton, 1993;
Vezhnevets et al., 2017), which involves a ‘manager’ agent
defining subgoals for a ‘worker’ agent in order to achieve
temporal abstraction. Feudal RL allows for the division of
tasks into a series of subtasks, but has largely been investi-
gated with only one worker per manager acting at any one
time. By introducing a feudal hierarchy with multiple agents
acting simultaneously in FMH, we not only divide tasks over
time but also across worker agents. Furthermore, we em-
brace the full multi-agent setting, in which observations are
not in general shared across agents.
We outline a method to implement FMH for concurrently
acting, communicating agents trained in a decentralised fash-
ion. Our approach pre-specifies appropriate positions in the
hierarchy as well as a mapping from the manager’s choice of
communication to the workers’ reward functions. We show
how to facilitate learning of our deep RL agents within FMH
through suitable pretraining and repeated communication to
encourage temporally extended goal-setting.
We conduct a range of experiments that highlight the advan-
tages of FMH. In particular, we show its ability to address
non-stationarity during training, as managerial reward ren-
ders the behaviour of workers more predictable. We also
demonstrate FMH’s ability to scale to many agents and
many possible goals, as well as to enable effective coordina-
tion amongst workers. It performs substantially better than
both decentralised and centralised approaches.
2. Background
2.1. Markov Decision Processes
Single-agent RL can be formalised in terms of Markov
Decision Processes, which consist of sets of states S and
actionsA, a reward function r : S×A → R and a transition
function T : S ×A → ∆(S), where ∆(S) denotes the set
of discrete probability distributions over S. Agents act
according to a stochastic policy pi : S × A → [0, 1]. One
popular objective is to maximise the discounted expected
future reward, defined as Epi[
∑∞
t=0 γ
tr(st, at)] where the
expectation is over the sequence of states and actions which
result from policy pi, starting from an initial state distribution
ρ0 : S → [0, 1]. Here γ ∈ [0, 1) is a discount factor
and t is the time step. This objective can be equivalently
expressed asEs∼ρpi,a∼pi[r(s, a)], where ρpi is the discounted
state distribution induced by policy pi starting from ρ0.
2.2. Deterministic Policy Gradient Algorithms
Deterministic policy gradients (DPG) is a frequently used
single-agent algorithm for continuous control using model-
free RL (Silver et al., 2014). It uses deterministic policies
µθ : S → A, whose parameters θ are adjusted in an off-
policy fashion using an exploratory behavioural policy to
perform stochastic gradient ascent on an objective J(θ) =
Es∼ρµ,a∼µθ [r(s, a)].
We can write the gradient of J(θ) as:
∇θJ(θ) = Es∼ρµ [∇θµθ(s)∇aQµ(s, a)|a=µθ(s)]. (1)
Deep Deterministic Policy Gradients (DDPG) (Lillicrap
et al., 2015) is a variant with policy µ and critic Qµ being
represented via deep neural networks. Like DQN (Mnih
et al., 2015), DDPG stores experienced transitions in a re-
play buffer and replays them during training.
2.3. Markov Games
A partially observable Markov game (POMG) (Littman,
1994; Hu et al., 1998) for N agents is defined by a set of
states S, and sets of actions A1, ...,AN and observations
O1, ...,ON for each agent. In general, the stochastic policy
of agent i may depend on the set of action-observation
histories Hi ≡ (Oi×Ai)∗ such that pii : Hi×Ai → [0, 1].
In this work we restrict ourselves to history-independent
stochastic policies pii : Oi ×Ai → [0, 1]. The next state is
generated according to the state transition function T : S ×
A1 × ...×An → ∆(S). Each agent i obtains deterministic
rewards defined as ri : S×A1× ...×An → R and receives
a private observation oi : S → Oi. There is an initial
state distribution ρ0 : S → [0, 1] and each agent aims to
maximise its own discounted sum of future rewards.
2.4. Centralised and Decentralised Training
In multi-agent RL, agents can be trained in a centralised
or decentralised fashion. In decentralised training, agents
have access only to local information: their own action and
observation histories during training (Tan, 1993). Agents
are often trained using single-agent methods for RL, such
as Q-Learning or DDPG.
In centralised training, the action and observation histories
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of all agents are used, effectively reducing the multi-agent
problem to a single-agent problem. Although it may appear
restrictive for agents to require access to this full informa-
tion, this approach has generated recent interest due to the
potential for centralised training of ultimately decentralised
policies (Lowe et al., 2017; Foerster et al., 2018). For exam-
ple, in simulation one can train a Q-function, known as a
critic, which exploits the action and observation histories of
all agents to aid the training of local policies for each one.
These policies can then be deployed in multi-agent systems
in the real world, where centralisation may be infeasible.
2.5. Multi-Agent Deep Determinstic Policy Gradients
Multi-agent deep deterministic policy gradients (MADDPG)
(Lowe et al., 2017) is an algorithm for centralised training
and decentralised control of multi-agent systems. It uses
deterministic polices, as in DDPG, which condition only
on each agent’s local observations and actions. MADDPG
handles the non-stationarity associated with the simultane-
ous adaptation of all the agents by introducing a separate
centralised critic for each agent. Lowe et al., trained history-
independent feedforward networks on a range of mixed
cooperative-competitive environments, significantly improv-
ing upon agents trained independently with DDPG.
3. Methods
We propose FMH, a framework for multi-agent RL which
addresses the three major issues outlined in the introduction:
non-stationarity, scalability and coordination. In order to
increase the generality of our approach, we do so without
requiring a number of potentially helpful features: access to
the observations of all agents (as in centralised training), a
differentiable model of the world’s dynamics or a differen-
tiable communication channel between agents.
3.1. Hierarchies
We begin by defining the type of hierarchical structure we
create for the agents. In its most straightforward setting,
this hierarchy corresponds to a rooted directed tree, with
the highest level manager as the root node and each worker
reporting to only a single manager. Our experiments use
this structure, although, for simplicity, using just two-level
hierarchies. However, we also note the possibility, in more
exotic circumstances, of considering more general directed
acyclic graphs in which a single worker reports to multiple
managers, and allowing for more than one manager at the
highest level of the hierarchy. Acyclicity prevents poten-
tially disastrous feedback cycles for the reward.
Appropriate assignment of agents to positions in a hierarchy
should depend on the varied observation and action capa-
bilities of the agents. Agents exposed to key information
associated with global task performance are likely to be
suited to the role of manager, whereas agents with more
narrow information, but which can act to achieve subgoals
are more naturally suited to being workers. As we show
in our experiments, identifying these differences can often
make assigning agents straightforward. Here, we specify
positions directly, to focus on demonstrating the resulting
effectiveness of the hierarchy. However, extensions in which
the hierarchy is itself learned would be interesting.
3.2. Goal-Setting
In FMH, managers set goals for workers by defining their
rewards. To arrange this, managers communicate a special
kind of message to workers that defines the workers’ reward
functions according to a specified mapping. For example,
if there are three objects in a room, we might allow the
manager to select from three different messages, each defin-
ing a worker reward function proportional to the negative
distance from a corresponding object. Our experiments ex-
plore variants of this scheme, imposing the constraint that
the structure of the reward function remain fixed whilst the
target is allowed to change. In this context and task, mes-
sages therefore correspond to ‘goals’ requiring approach to
different objects. The manager must learn to communicate
these goals judiciously in order to solve complex tasks. In
turn, the workers must learn how to act in the light of the re-
sulting managerial reward, in addition to immediate rewards
(or costs) they might also experience.
Manager
Worker 1 Worker 2
Environment
Figure 1. An example of a worker-computed Feudal Multiagent
Hierarchy with one manager agent and two worker agents. Worker
rewards are goal-dependent and computed locally, the manager’s
reward is provided by the environment.
Since a communicated goal is simply another type of action
for the manager, our approach is consistent with the formal-
ism of a (partially-observable) Markov game, for which the
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reward for agent i is defined as ri : S ×A1× ...×An → R.
However, the worker’s reward need not be treated as part of
the environment. For instance, each worker agent i could
compute its own reward locally ri : Oi×Ai → R, whereOi
includes the observed goal from the manager. We illustrate
this ‘worker-computed’ interpretation in Fig. 1.
3.3. Pretraining and Temporally Extended Subgoals
We next consider the issue of non-stationarity. This fre-
quently arises in multi-agent RL because the policies of
other agents may change in unpredictable ways as they learn.
By contrast, in FMH we allow manager agents to determine
the reward functions of workers, compelling the workers
towards more predictable behaviour from the perspective
of the manager. However, the same issue applies at the
starting point of learning for workers: they will not yet have
learned how to satisfy the goals. We would therefore expect
a manager to underestimate the value of the subgoals it se-
lects early in training, potentially leading it sub-optimally to
discard subgoals which are harder for the worker to learn.
Thus, it would be beneficial for worker agents already to
have learned to fulfill managerial subgoals. We address
this issue practically in two steps. First, we introduce a
bottom-up ‘pretraining’ procedure, in which we initially
train the workers before training the manager. Although the
manager is not trained during this period, it still acts in the
multi-agent environment and sets subgoals for the worker
agents. As subgoals are initially of (approximately) equal
value, the manager will explore them uniformly. If the set
of possible subgoals is sufficiently compact, this will enable
workers to gain experience of each potential subgoal.
This pretraining does not completely solve the non-
stationarity problem. This is because the untrained manager
will, with high probability, vacillate between subgoals, pre-
venting the workers under its command from having any
reasonable hope of extracting reward. We therefore want
managers not only to try out a variety of subgoals but also
to commit to them long enough that they have any hope of
being at least partially achieved. Thus, the second compo-
nent of the solution is a communication-repeat heuristic for
the manager such that goal-setting is temporally extended.
We demonstrate its effectiveness in our experiments.
3.4. Coordination
Multi-agent problems may have many equilibria, and good
ones can only be achieved through effective coordination of
agent behaviour. In FMH, the responsibility of coordination
is incumbent upon the manager, which exerts control over
its workers through its provision of reward. We show in the
simplified setting of a matrix game, how a manager may
coordinate the actions of its workers (see Suppl. Mat. C).
3.5. FMH-DDPG
FMH provides a framework for rewarding agents in multi-
agent domains, and can work with many different RL algo-
rithms. In our experiments, we chose to apply FMH in com-
bination with the single-agent algorithm DDPG, trained in
a fully decentralised fashion. As we do not experiment with
combining FMH with any other algorithm, we frequently
refer to FMH-DDPG simply as FMH.
3.6. Parameter Sharing
We apply our method to scenarios in which a large number
of agents have identical properties. For convenience, when
training using a decentralised algorithm (FMH-DDPG or
vanilla DDPG) we implement parameter sharing among
identical agents, in order to train them efficiently. We only
add experience from a single agent (among those sharing
parameters) into the shared replay buffer, and carry out a
single set of updates. We find this gives very similar results
to training without parameter sharing, in which each agent
is updated using its own experiences stored in its own replay
buffer (see Suppl. Mat. A.2).
4. Experiments and Results
We used the multi-agent particle environment1 as a frame-
work for conducting experiments to test the potential of
our method to address the issues of non-stationarity, scala-
bility and coordination, comparing against MADDPG and
DDPG. We will release code for both the model and the
environments after the reviewing process ends.
The RL agents have both an actor and a critic, each cor-
responding to a feedforward neural network. We give a
detailed summary of all hyperparameters used in Suppl.
Mat. A.1.
4.1. Cooperative Communication
We first experiment with an environment implemented in
Lowe et al. (2017) called ‘Cooperative Communication’
(Figure 2a), in which there are two cooperative agents, one
called the ‘speaker’ and the other called the ‘listener’, placed
in an environment with many landmarks of differing colours.
On each episode, the listener must navigate to a randomly
selected landmark; and in the original problem, both lis-
tener and speaker obtain reward proportional to the negative
distance2 of the listener from the correct target. However,
whilst the listener observes its relative position from each
of the differently coloured landmarks, it does not know to
which landmark it must navigate. Instead, the colour of the
1https://github.com/openai/multiagent-particle-envs
2The original implementation used the negative square distance;
we found this slightly worse for all algorithms.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2. Cooperative Communication with 1 listener and 12 landmarks. (a) The speaker (grey circle) sees the colour of the listener (green
circle) , which indicates the target landmark (green square). It communicates a message to the listener at every time step. Here there are
12 landmarks and the agent trained using FMH has successfully navigated to the correct landmark. (b) FMH substantially outperforms
MADDPG and DDPG. The dotted green line indicates the end of pretraining for FMH. (c) FMH worker reward and the probability of the
manager correctly assigning the correct target to the worker. The manager learns to assign the target correctly with probability 1.
target landmark can be seen by the speaker, which cannot
observe the listener and is unable to move. The speaker
can however communicate to the listener at every time step,
and so successful performance on the task corresponds to
the speaker enabling the listener to reach the correct target.
We also note that, although reward is provided during the
episode, it is used only for training agents and not directly
observed, which means that agents cannot simply learn to
follow the gradient of reward.
Although this task seems simple, it is challenging for many
RL methods. Lowe et al. (2017) trained, in a decentralised
fashion, a variety of single-agent algorithms, including
DDPG, DQN and trust-region policy optimisation (Schul-
man et al., 2015) on a version of this problem with three
landmarks and demonstrated that they all perform poorly
on this task. Of these methods, DDPG reached the highest
level of performance and so we use DDPG as the strongest
commonly used baseline for the decentralised approach. We
also compare our results to MADDPG, which combines
DDPG with centralised training. MADDPG was found to
perform strongly on Cooperative Communication with three
landmarks, far exceeding the performance of DDPG.
For our method, FMH, we also utilised DDPG, but reverted
to the more generalizable decentralized training that was
previously ineffective. Crucially, we assigned the speaker
the role of manager and the listener the role of worker. The
speaker can therefore communicate messages which corre-
spond to the subgoals of the different coloured landmarks.
The listener is not therefore rewarded for going to the correct
target but is instead rewarded proportional to the negative
distance from the speaker-assigned target. The speaker itself
is rewarded according to the original problem definition, the
negative distance of the listener from the true target.
We investigated in detail a version of Cooperative Commu-
nication with 12 possible landmarks (Figure 2a). FMH per-
formed significantly better than both MADDPG and DDPG
(Figure 2b) over a training period of 100 epochs (each epoch
corresponds to 1000 episodes). For FMH, we pretrained the
worker for 10 epochs and enforced extended communication
over 8 time steps (each episode is 25 time steps).
In Figure 2c, the left axis shows the reward received by
the FMH worker (listener) over training. This increased
during pretraining and again immediately after pretraining
concludes. Managerial learning after pretraining resulted
in decreased entropy of communication over the duration
of an episode (see Suppl. Mat. A.3), allowing the worker
to optimise the managerial objective more effectively. This
in turn enabled the manager to assign goals correctly, with
the rise in the probability of correct assignment occurring
shortly thereafter (right axis), then reaching perfection.
Our results show how FMH resolves the issue of non-
stationarity. Initially, workers are able to achieve reward
by learning to optimise managerial objectives, even whilst
the manager itself is not competent. This learning elicits
robust behaviour from the worker, conditioned on manage-
rial communication, which makes workers more predictable
from the persepective of the manager. This then enables the
manager to achieve competency – learning to assign goals
so as to solve the overall task.
Our implementation of FMH used both pretraining and ex-
tended goal-setting with a communication repeat heuristic.
In Suppl. Mat. A.4, we show that pretraining the worker
improved performance on this task, although even with-
out pretraining FMH still performed better than MADDPG
and DDPG. The introduction of extended communication is
however more critical. In Figure 3 we show the performance
of FMH with goal-setting over various number of time steps
(and fixed pretraining period of 10 epochs). When there
Feudal Multi-Agent Hierarchies
NUMBER OF FINAL REWARD EPOCHS UNTIL CONVERGENCE
LISTENERS LANDMARKS FMH MADDPG DDPG COM FMH MADDPG DDPG
1 3 −6.63± 0.05 −6.58± 0.03 −14.26± 0.07 −17.28 56 24 55
1 6 −6.91± 0.07 −6.69± 0.06 −18.10± 0.07 −18.95 57 66 42
1 12 −7.79± 0.06 −15.96± 0.09 −19.32± 0.11 −19.56 − − 36
3 6 −7.10± 0.04 −11.13± 0.03 −18.90± 0.05 −18.95 77 − 50
5 6 −7.17± 0.03 −18.47± 0.04 −19.73± 0.06 −18.95 79 75 53
10 6 −8.96± 0.03 −19.80± 0.06 −21.19± 0.03 −18.95 − 59 32
Table 1. Performance of FMH, MADDPG and DDPG for versions of Cooperative Communication with different numbers of listeners and
landmarks. Final reward is determined by training for 100 epochs and evaluating the mean reward per episode in the final epoch. We
indicate no convergence with a − symbol. For further details see Sup. Mat. A.6.
were no communication repeats (Comm 1), performance
was similar to MADDPG, but introducing even a single
repeat greatly improved performance. By contrast, introduc-
ing communication repeats to MADDPG did not improve
performance (see Suppl. Mat. A.5).
Figure 3.
Communication sent
by the manager is re-
peated for extended
goal-setting over var-
ious numbers of time
steps.
4.1.1. SCALING TO MANY AGENTS
We next scaled Cooperative Communication to include
many listener agents. At the beginning of an episode each
listener is randomly assigned a target out of all the possible
landmarks and the colour of each listener’s target is ob-
served by the speaker. The speaker communicates a single
message to each listener at every time step. To allow for
easy comparison with versions of Cooperative Communi-
cation with only one listener, we normalised the reward by
the number of listeners. As discussed in the methods, we
shared parameters across listeners for FMH and DDPG.
In Table 1 we show the performance of FMH, MADDPG
and DDPG for variants of Cooperative Communication with
different numbers of listener agents and landmarks. Con-
sider the version with 6 landmarks, which we found that
MADDPG could solve with a single listener within 100
epochs (unlike for 12 landmarks). On increasing the num-
ber of listeners up to a maximum of 10, we found that FMH
scales much better than MADDPG; FMH was able to learn
an effective policy with 5 listener agents whereas MAD-
DPG could not. Further, FMH even scaled to 10 listeners,
although it did not converge over the 100 epochs.
To aid interpretation of the reward values in Table 1 we also
compare performance to a policy which simply moves to
the centroid of the landmarks. This ‘Centre of Mass’ (CoM)
agent was trained using MADDPG until convergence on a
synthetic task in which reaching the centroid is maximally
rewarded, and then evaluated on the true version of the task.
We find that both MADDPG and DDPG do not perform
better than the CoM agent when there are 10 listeners and 6
landmarks.
In Figure 4 we show the final state achieved on an example
episode of this version of the task, for agents trained using
MADDPG and FMH. After training for 100 epochs, MAD-
DPG listeners do not find the correct targets by the end of
the episode whereas FMH listeners manage to do so.
  
MADDPG FMH
Figure 4. Scaling Cooperative Communication to 10 listeners with
6 landmarks - final time step on example episode.
4.2. Cooperative Coordination
We then designed a task to test coordination called ‘Coop-
erative Coordination’ (Figure 5a). In this task, there are 6
landmarks. At the beginning of each episode 3 landmarks
are randomly selected to be green targets and 3 blue decoys.
A team of 3 agents must navigate to cover the green targets
whilst ignoring the blue decoys, but they are unable to see
the colours of the landmarks. A fourth agent, the speaker,
can see the colours of the landmarks and can send messages
to the other agents (but cannot move). All agents can see
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Figure 5. Cooperative Coordination (a) Three listeners (light grey agents) must move to cover the green landmarks whilst ignoring the
blue landmarks. However, only the speaker (dark grey agent) can see the landmarks’ colours; it communicates with the listeners at every
time step. In this example, FMH agents have successfully coordinated to cover the three correct targets. (b) FMH performs significantly
better than MADDPG and DDPG. The dotted green line indicates the end of pretraining for FMH. (c) Agents trained using FMH cover
on average more targets, by the end of the episode, than MADDPG and DDPG (d) Agents trained using FMH avoid collisions more
effectively than MADDPG and DDPG over the duration of an episode.
each others’ positions and velocities, are large in size and
face penalties if they collide with each other. The task shares
aspects with ‘Cooperative Navigation’ from (Lowe et al.,
2017) but is considerably more complex due to the greater
number of potential targets and the hidden information.
We apply FMH to this problem, assigning the speaker agent
the role of manager. One consideration is whether the man-
ager, the worker, or both should receive the negative penal-
ties due to worker collisions. Here we focus on the case in
which the manager only concerns itself with the ‘task’ re-
ward function. Penalties associated with collisions are there-
fore experienced only by the workers themselves, which
seek to avoid these whilst still optimising the managerial
objective.
In Figure 5b we compare the performance of FMH to MAD-
DPG and DDPG. As with Cooperative Communication,
FMH does considerably better than both after training for
150 epochs. This is further demonstrated when we evaluate
the trained policies over a period of 10 epochs: Figure 5c
shows the mean number of targets covered by the final time
step of the episode, for which FMH more than doubles
MADDPG. Figure 5d shows the mean number of collisions
(which are negatively rewarded) during an episode. FMH
collides very rarely whereas MADDPG and DDPG collide
over 4 times more frequently.
We also implement a version of Cooperative Coordination in
which the manager is responsible not only for coordinating
its workers but must also navigate to targets itself. We find
that it can learn to do both roles effectively (see Suppl. Mat.
B.2.1).
4.2.1. EXPLOITING DIVERSITY
One role of a manager is to use the diversity it has available
in its workers to solve tasks more effectively. We tested
this in a version of Cooperative Coordination in which one
of the listener agents was lighter than the other two and so
could reach farther targets more quickly.
We trained FMH (without parameter sharing due to the
diversity) on this task and then evaluated the trained policies
on a ‘Two-Near, One-Far’ (TNOF) version of the task in
which one target is far away and the remaining two are
close (see Suppl. Mat. B.2.2). We did this to investigate
whether FMH, which was trained on the general problem,
had learned the specific strategy of assigning the farthest
target to the fastest agent. We found this this to be true 100
percent of the time (evaluating over 10 epochs); we illustrate
this behaviour in Figure 6.
	 	
Figure 6. FMH solves the TNOF task (example episode). Left:
Agents are initialised at the bottom of the environment, two targets
are close by, and one far away. Right: By the end of the episode,
the faster (red) agent covers the farther target on the right, despite
starting on the left.
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5. Discussion
We have shown how cooperative multi-agent problems can
be solved efficiently by defining a hierarchy of agents. Our
hierarchy was reward-based, with manager agents setting
goals for workers, and with the highest level manager opti-
mising the overall task objective. Our method, called FMH,
was trained in a decentralised fashion and showed consider-
ably better scaling and coordination than both centralised
and decentralised methods that used a shared reward func-
tion.
Our work was partly inspired by the feudal RL architecture
(FRL) (Dayan & Hinton, 1993), a single-agent method for
hierarchical RL (Barto & Mahadevan, 2003) which was also
developed in the context of deep RL by Vezhnevets et al.
(2017). In particular, FMH addresses the ‘too many chiefs’
inefficiency inherent to FRL, namely that each manager
only has a single worker under its control. A much wider
range of management possibilities and benefits arises when
multiple agents operate at the same time to achieve one
or more tasks (Busoniu et al., 2008). We focused on the
cooperative setting (Panait & Luke, 2005); however, unlike
the fully-cooperative setting, in which all agents optimise
a shared reward function (Boutilier, 1996) our approach
introduces a diversity of rewards, which can help with credit-
assignment (Wolpert & Tumer, 2002; Chang et al., 2004) but
also introduces elements of competition. This competition
need not always be deleterious; for example, in some cases,
an effective way of optimising the task objective might be
to induce competition amongst workers, as in generative
adversarial networks (Goodfellow et al., 2014).
We followed FRL (though not all its successors; (Vezhn-
evets et al., 2017) in isolating the workers from much of
the true environmental reward, making them focus on their
own narrower tasks. Such reward hiding was not complete
– we considered individualised or internalised costs from
collisions that workers experienced directly, such that their
reward was not purely managerially dependent. A more
complete range of possibilities for creating and decompos-
ing rewards between managers and workers when the objec-
tives of the two are not perfectly aligned, could usefully be
studied under the aegis of principal-agent problems (Jensen
& Meckling, 1976; Laffont & Martimort, 2009).
Goal-setting in FMH was achieved by specifying a relation-
ship between the chosen managerial communication and
the resulting reward function. The communication was also
incorporated into the observational state of the worker; how-
ever, the alternative possibility of a goal-embedding would
be worth exploring (Vezhnevets et al., 2017). We also speci-
fied goals directly in the observational space of the workers,
whereas Vezhnevets et al. specified goals in a learned hidden
representation. This would likely be of particular value for
problems in which defining a set of subgoals is challenging,
such as those which require learning directly from pixels.
More generally, work on the way that agents can learn to
construct and agree upon a language for goal-setting would
be most important.
To train our multi-agent systems we leveraged recent ad-
vances in the field of deep RL; in particular the algorithm
DDPG (Lillicrap et al., 2015), which can learn in a de-
centralised fashion. Straightforward application of this al-
gorithm has been shown to achieve some success in the
multi-agent domain (Gupta et al., 2017) but also shown it
to be insufficient in handling more complex multi-agent
problems (Lowe et al., 2017). By introducing a managerial
hierarchy, we showed that FMH-DDPG has the potential to
greatly facilitate multi-agent learning whilst still retaining
the advantage of decentralised training. Our proposed ap-
proach could also be combined with centralised methods,
and this would be worth further exploration.
Other work in multi-agent RL has also benefitted from ideas
from hierarchical RL. The MAXQ algorithm (Dietterich,
2000) has been used to train homogenous agents (Makar
et al., 2001), allowing them to coordinate by communicat-
ing subtasks rather than primitive actions, an idea recently
re-explored in the context of deep RL (Tang et al., 2018). A
meta-controller which structures communication between
agent pairs in order to achieve coordination has also been
proposed (Kumar et al., 2017) (and could naturally be hy-
bridized with FMH), as well as the use of master-slave
architecture which merges the actions of a centralised mas-
ter agent with those of decentralised slave agents (Kong
et al., 2017). Taken together, these methods represent inter-
esting alternatives for invoking hierarchy which are unlike
our primarily reward-based approach.
There are a number of additional directions for future work.
First, the hierarchies used were simple in structure and spec-
ified in advance, based on our knowledge of the various
information and action capabilities of the agents. It would
be interesting to develop mechanisms for the formation of
complex hierarchies. Second, in settings in which workers
can acquire relevant task information, it would be worth-
while investigating how a manager might incentivise them
to provide this. Third, it would be interesting to consider
how a manager might learn to allocate resources, such as
money, computation or communication bandwidth to en-
able efficient group behaviour. Finally, we did not explore
how managers should train or supervise the workers beneath
them, such as through reward shaping (Ng et al., 1999).
Such an approach might benefit from recurrent networks,
which could enable managers to use the history of worker
performance to better guide their learning.
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A. Experimental Results
A.1. Parameter settings
In all of our experiments, we used the Adam optimizer with
a learning rate of 0.001 and τ = 0.01 for updating the
target networks. γ was 0.75. The size of the replay buffer
was 107 and we updated the network parameters after every
100 samples added to the replay buffer. We used a batch
size of 1024 episodes before making an update. For our
feedforward networks we used two hidden layers with 256
neurons per layer. We trained with 10 random seeds (except
otherwise stated).
Hyperparameters were optimised using a line search centred
on the experimental parameters used in (Lowe et al., 2017).
Our optimised parameters were found to be identical except
for a lower value of γ (0.75) and of the learning rate (0.001),
and a larger replay buffer (107). We found these values gave
the best performance for both MADDPG and FMH on a
version of Cooperative Communication with 6 landmarks
evaluated after 50 epochs (an epoch is defined to be 1000
episodes).
A.2. Parameter Sharing
We implemented parameter sharing for the decentralised
algorithms DDPG and FMH. To make training results ap-
proximately similar to implementations which do not use
parameter sharing we restrict updates to a single agent and
add experience only from a single agent to the shared re-
play buffer (amongst those sharing parameters). We find
in practice that both approaches give very similar results
for FMH, whereas parameter sharing slightly improves the
performance of DDPG – we show this for a version of
Cooperative Communication with 3 listeners and 6 targets
(Figure S1). In general sharing parameters reduces train-
ing time considerably, particularly as the number of agents
scales.
Figure S1. Parameter
sharing does not
affect performance
for FMH but slightly
improves DDPG.
A.3. Entropy of Communication
We show the change in entropy of communication over the
duration of an episode for the various algorithms (Figure
S2). Agents are trained on Cooperative Communication
with 12 landmarks and a single listener. As the target does
not change during the middle of an episode, we expect the
entropy to decrease as agents learn.
For FMH, during pretraining, entropy is high as all goals
are sampled approximately uniformly (but with enforced ex-
tended communication over 8 time steps). However, shortly
after pretraining ends the entropy of managerial communi-
cation rapidly decreases. This is in contrast to MADDPG
which decreases in entropy more steadily.
Figure S2. Entropy
of managerial com-
munication over
the duration of an
episode at different
stages in training
A.4. Pretraining
Agents trained using FMH were pretrained for 10 epochs
across all experiments. During pretraining all agents act
in the multi-agent environment. Although all experiences
are added appropriately into the replay buffers, the manager
does not update its parameters during pretraining whereas
the workers do.
We show the benefits of pretraining on Cooperative Com-
munication with 12 landmarks and a single listener agent in
Figure S3.
Figure S3. Pretraining
improves FMH, al-
though agents can
still learn effectively
without it. We use
extended communi-
cation (goal-setting)
for 8 time steps.
A.5. Extended Communication
In the main text we showed that extended goal-setting in
FMH lead to substantially improved performance. We also
considered whether a similar approach would benefit meth-
ods which do not treat communication as goals.
We found that extended communication did not help MAD-
DPG on the same task, with learning curves being in all
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cases virtually identical (Figure S4).
Figure S4.
Extended commu-
nication does not
significantly improve
the performance of
MADDPG.
A.6. Further details on Table 1
Values in the table were determined using 10 random seeds
in all cases, except for the one exception of MADDPG with
10 listeners and 6 landmarks, which used 3 random seeds
(training time is substantially longer as we do not share
parameters). The CoM agent was trained on the synthetic
task with different numbers of landmarks. Performance of
the trained CoM policies was then evaluated over a period
of 10 epochs on the corresponding true tasks.
Convergence was determined by comparing the mean perfor-
mance in the final 5 epochs with the mean performance of a
sliding window 5 epochs in width (we also take the mean
across random seeds). If the mean performance within the
window was within 2 percent of the final performance, and
remained so for all subsequent epochs, we defined this as
convergence, unless the first time this happened was within
the final 10 epochs. In such a case, we define the algorithm
as not having converged. For assessing the exact time of
convergence in the case of FMH we report values which
include the 10 epochs of pretraining.
A.7. Cooperative Communication with 3 landmarks
For reference we show performance of the various algo-
rithms on Cooperative Communication with 3 landmarks.
Both MADDPG and FMH perform well on this task, al-
though MADDPG reaches convergence more rapidly (Fig-
ure S5).
Figure S5. Cooperative
Communication with
1 listener and 3
landmarks.
B. Environments
B.1. Cooperative Communication
We provide further details on our version of Cooperative
Communication (see main text for original description). In
general, we keep environment details the same as Lowe et
al., including the fact that the manager only has access to
the target colour. However, we also scale up the number
of coloured landmarks, which we do by taking the RGB
values provided in the multi-agent particle environment,
[0.65, 0.15, 0.15], [0.15, 0.65, 0.15], [0.15, 0.15, 0.65], and
adding 9 more by placing them on the remaining vertices
of the corresponding cube and at the centre-point of four of
the faces (in RGB space). The colours for the 12 landmarks
are therefore:
[0.65, 0.15, 0.15], [0.15, 0.65, 0.15], [0.15, 0.15, 0.65],
[0.65, 0.65, 0.15], [0.15, 0.65, 0.65], [0.65, 0.15, 0.65],
[0.65, 0.65, 0.65], [0.15, 0.15, 0.15], [0.40, 0.40, 0.65],
[0.40, 0.40, 0.15], [0.15, 0.40, 0.40], [0.65, 0.40, 0.40].
The particular colour values used for the landmarks influ-
ences the performance of RL algorithms as landmarks which
have similar colours are harder for the speaker to learn to
distinguish.
B.2. Cooperative Coordination
We provide further details on our version of Cooperative
Coordination (see main text for original description). The
task provides a negative reward of -1 to each agent involved
in a collisions. For DDPG and MADDPG this penalty
is shared across agents, whereas in FMH only the agents
involved in the collision experience this penalty.
We also evaluated performance of trained policies in Figures
5c and 5d with slight modifications to the overall task. In
the case of Figure 5c, to ensure that targets were never
impossible to achieve by overlapping with the immobile
manager, we moved the manager off-screen. For Figure 5d
we ensured that agent positions were never initialised in a
way such that they would automatically collide (such cases
are rare).
B.2.1. COORDINATION WITH A MOBILE MANAGER
We implemented a version of Cooperative Coordination
with 2 listeners and 1 speaker which together need to cover
the 3 green targets. The manager must multi-task, directing
workers to the correct targets whilst also covering these
targets itself. We find that the manager learns to do this,
outperforming both MADDPG and DDPG (Figure S6)
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Figure S6. FMH
performs well, even
when the manager is
required to move to
cover targets whilst
also setting goals for
workers
B.2.2. THE TWO-NEAR, ONE-FAR TASK
This task is not used for training but to evaluate the per-
formance of agents trained on a version of Cooperative
Coordination in which one agent is twice as light as normal
and the remaining two are twice as heavy.
Evaluating the optimal assignments on this task can be dif-
ficult, so we assess it in the more easily interpreted TNOF
environment. In TNOF, the agents start at the bottom of the
environment. Two green targets are located nearby (in bot-
tom 40 percent of screen) whereas one target is far away (in
top 30 percent of screen). The x-coordinates are randomly
sampled at the beginning of each episode and blue decoys
are also added (one nearby, two far).
C. Solving a Coordination Game
Some of the most popular forms of multiagent task are
coordination games from microeconomics in which there are
multiple good and bad Nash equilibria, and it is necessary to
find the former. It is intuitively obvious that appointing one
of the agents as a manager might resolve the symmetries
inherent in cooperative coordination game in which agents
need to take different actions to receive reward:
Player Y
A B
Player X A (0, 0) (1, 1)
B (1, 1) (0, 0)
This game has two pure strategy Nash equilibria and one
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium which is Pareto dominated
by the pure strategies. The challenge of this game is
for both agents to choose a single Pareto optimal Nash
equilibrium, either (A,B) or (B,A).
For a matrix game, we define the feudal approach
as allowing Player X , the manager, to specify the reward
player Y will receive for its actions. This is a simplification
when compared to the more general setting of a Markov
game in which the feudal manager can reward not only
actions but also achievement of certain states.3. In order to
specify the reward, we assume that Player X communicates
a goal, either gA or gB , prior to both players taking their
actions. If Player X sends gA it means that action A is now
rewarded for Player Y and action B is not. Player X’s
rewards are unchanged, and so together this induces the
following matrix game:
Player Y
A B
Player X A (0, 1) (1, 0)
B (1, 1) (0, 0)
Action A for player Y is now strictly dominant and so a
rational Player Y will always choose it. By iterated elimi-
nation of strictly dominated strategies we therefore find the
resulting matrix game:
Player Y
A
Player X A (0, 1)
B (1, 1)
And so a rational Player X will always choose B, resulting
in an overall strategy of (B,A) conditioned on an initial
communication of gA. By symmetry, we can see that con-
ditioned on gB , rational players X and Y will play (A,B).
The feudal approach therefore allows the manager to flexibly
coordinate the pair of agents to either Nash equilibrium. For
games involving N players, coordination can be achieved
by the manager sending out N-1 goals.
3Typically we prefer the manager to choose distal states as
targets rather than actions as this requires the manager to micro-
manage less and so supports temporal abstraction
